



THE MPSA WOMEN'S OPERATIVE SERIES

# DIPLOMAT

BOOK 5



**PHASE 2: THE FIELD**





**BOOK 5**

# **DIPLOMAT**

The Art and Science of Influence, Negotiation, and Soft Power

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THE MPSA LIBRARY SERIES | BOOK FIVE



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*DIPLOMAT*

*The Art and Science of Influence, Negotiation, and Soft Power*

*For the women who have always known how to read a room,*

*how to find the common ground,*

*how to get to yes when everyone else was stuck at no.*

*For those who sat at tables where their presence*

*was questioned before a word was spoken,*

*and changed the outcome anyway.*

*The most powerful person in the room*

*is the one who understands everyone in it.*

*You have always been that person.*

**This book explains why it works.**

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A handwritten signature in black ink, reading 'Terry Oroszi'. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a horizontal line underlining the name.

COMPANION TO THE DIPLOMAT RIBBON

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## A Guide for Readers

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PROFILER is designed to be read in two ways: straight through, and in conversation with the Profiler Ribbon course it accompanies. You will get something from reading it either way, but you will get something different depending on when and how you read. If you are reading before beginning the course: read it as orientation. Let it give you the scientific and historical foundation for what you are about to train. Pay particular attention to the historical profiles: not for their drama, but for their methodology. Notice what these women actually did. Notice where their capacity came from. Notice that none of them were exceptions. If you are reading alongside the course: read it as context. When the course asks you to practice a specific skill, find the section of this book that covers the science beneath that skill. The course teaches what to do. This book explains why it works: and why it is yours to do. If you are reading after completing the course: read it as integration. You will find, as promised in the introduction, that the second read feels different. By then you will have direct experience with the material, and the historical and scientific context will land differently against that experience. At the end of each chapter, you will find a set of Reflection Questions. These are not assignments. They are invitations: points where the chapter's ideas can be turned inward and made personal. Some of them will be immediately relevant to your experience. Some will not. Take what is useful.

Following the reflection questions, you will find journal pages. Use them or not. Some people find that writing produces a different kind of processing than reading. If you are one of them, use the space. If you are not, leave it blank. Both choices are fine. Finally: this book is free. It is not free because the content is low-quality. It is free because the women who need it most cannot always pay for it. If this book is useful to you, tell someone else about it. That is the only payment requested.

### **Pro Bono Non Malo: For Good, Not Evil**

# The Most

# The Most

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Underestimated Skill in the Room

## The Most Underestimated Skill in the Room

There is a common misunderstanding about influence. Most people believe it is something you do to other people. A technique. A lever. A trick of framing or timing that causes someone to say yes when they were about to say no. This book will not teach you that. What this book will teach you is something considerably more interesting and considerably more durable: influence as a discipline of understanding. The capacity to identify what matters to the person across from you, to find the ground where your interests and theirs are not actually opposed, and to build outcomes that neither of you could have reached alone. This is what diplomats do. It is also what good negotiators do, and good managers, and good parents, and good friends. It is what happens in any room where someone cares enough about the outcome to understand the people standing between them and it. The word diplomacy comes from the Greek diploma, meaning a folded paper, a credential, a document conferring authority. For most of recorded history, it was a profession reserved for men of rank and connections. The history of women in diplomacy is, in large part, a history of doing the work without the title: shaping outcomes from positions that did not officially exist, through channels that were not officially recognized, using skills that were not officially valued. The women profiled in this book operated in rooms where their presence was sometimes barely tolerated and their influence was rarely acknowledged.

They negotiated treaties, shifted alliances, drafted documents that governed millions of people, and changed the arc of events through the disciplined exercise of exactly the skills this book describes. None of them were exceptions. All of them were practitioners. The Diplomat Ribbon teaches you the operational framework: interest-based negotiation, strategic communication, influence architecture, the concession framework, the long game. This book provides the scientific and historical foundation beneath that framework. Understanding the neuroscience of persuasion, the psychology of trust, and the mechanics of power dynamics is what makes the skills stick when the pressure is real. By the time you finish this book and begin the Diplomat Ribbon, you will have something most people in negotiation rooms never develop: a genuine understanding of why the person across the table holds the position they hold, and what it would take to move together toward something better than either of you started with.

The Architecture of Influence How Persuasion Works in the Brain

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You cannot move people until you understand what is already moving them.

CHAPTER ONE

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# The Architecture of Influence

Influence Is Not Manipulation

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*There is a clean line between influence and manipulation, and it matters to know*

# The Architecture of Influence

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rational agency: through deception, emotional coercion, or exploiting cognitive biases in ways that serve the manipulator at the expense of the manipulated. Influence, as this chapter uses the term, is something different. It is the process of providing someone with new information, new framing, or new understanding in ways that allow them to update their position freely. The distinction is not merely ethical. It is practical. Manipulation, when detected, destroys trust and closes negotiations permanently. Influence, when executed well, creates the conditions for durable agreement. One is a short-term extraction. The other is a long-term investment.

The Neuroscience of Yes Decisions are not made by the rational mind alone. Decades of research in behavioral economics and cognitive neuroscience have established that human decision-making is a dual-process phenomenon: a fast, intuitive system that operates below conscious awareness, and a slower, deliberative system that generates post-hoc justifications for conclusions the fast system has already

reached. This matters for influence because it means that logical argument, while necessary, is rarely sufficient. People do not change their minds when they are presented with facts that contradict their beliefs. They change their minds when something shifts the emotional landscape around the belief: when the belief stops serving them, when someone they trust holds a different view, when the cost of maintaining the position becomes visible in a new way. Effective influence addresses both systems simultaneously.

Reciprocity and the Social Brain The human brain is a social organ. It evolved in a context of prolonged interdependence, where survival depended on the ability to maintain cooperative relationships across time. One consequence of this evolutionary history is a set of deeply rooted social norms that govern exchange, one of which is reciprocity: the drive to return what we have received. Robert Cialdini's landmark research documented reciprocity as one of the most robust influence principles across cultures. When someone gives us something, including information, attention, or a concession, we experience social pressure to give something back. Skilled negotiators understand that small acts of generosity early in a negotiation shift the balance of subsequent exchanges. This is not manipulation. It is working with, rather than against, the grain of human social architecture.

## Framing and the Power of Context

The same information, presented in different frames, produces measurably different responses. A medical treatment described as having a ninety percent survival rate is evaluated more favorably than one described as having a ten percent mortality rate, even though the two descriptions are statistically identical. This is not irrationality. It is the brain's efficient use of context to assign meaning. In negotiation, framing is one of the most powerful tools available. How you describe a proposal, what reference points you establish, what you name and what you leave unnamed: all of these shape the landscape in which the other party processes what you are offering. Understanding framing means understanding that the words you choose are not neutral. They are architecture.

The Role of Timing Influence is not only about what you say but when you say it. Research on decision fatigue documents that the quality of decisions deteriorates over the course of a day as the brain's capacity for deliberation is depleted. Proposals made at the beginning of a negotiation session, before cognitive resources are depleted, are evaluated differently than the same proposals made late in the day. Timing also operates at the relational level. A request made after a connection has been established, after trust has been built, after the other party has had the experience of being understood, is received differently than the same request made cold. Diplomatic patience is not merely a personality trait. It is a strategic understanding that the right moment to make a move is not always the moment when the move becomes available.

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## HISTORICAL PROFILE

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### Eleanor Roosevelt 1884 to 1962

Eleanor Roosevelt is best remembered as First Lady of the United States, a role she transformed from ceremonial to substantive during the twelve years her husband Franklin held the presidency. But her most consequential diplomatic work came after that, when Harry Truman appointed her as a delegate to the newly formed United Nations in 1945. The appointment was controversial. Several male delegates objected to working with a woman. Roosevelt responded to this resistance the way she responded to most obstacles: by doing the work so well that the objections became irrelevant. She was assigned to Committee Three, which addressed humanitarian, educational, and cultural questions. The assignment was considered a minor posting. She turned it into the central work of her tenure. The drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights took two years. Roosevelt chaired the drafting committee, navigating disagreements between delegates from fifty-eight nations with radically different political systems, cultural traditions, and definitions of human dignity. The Soviet bloc wanted economic rights foregrounded. Western democracies wanted civil and political rights. Newly decolonized nations wanted self-determination recognized explicitly. Religious delegations had concerns about provisions on marriage and family. Roosevelt held the negotiations together through a combination of genuine listening, strategic patience, and relentless focus on language that could accommodate multiple interpretations without losing substantive content. She understood that getting

every party to yes on the same document required understanding what yes meant to each of them, and building the document around the intersections rather than the conflicts.

The Declaration was adopted on December 10, 1948. Forty-eight nations voted in favor. Eight abstained. None voted against. It remains the foundational document of international human rights law, and it exists in the form it does because one person at the table understood that the goal was not to win the argument but to build the agreement.

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## REFLECTION QUESTIONS

### **The Architecture of Influence**

#### *Questions for Personal Application*

1. Think of a time when you changed your mind not because of new information but because of a shift in how the information was framed. What changed, and why did the new framing land differently than the old one?
2. Where in your life do you rely primarily on logical argument to persuade people? What emotional dimensions of those situations might you be underestimating?
3. Identify a relationship in which reciprocity operates strongly. How does the exchange of small favors, information, or attention shape the larger dynamic? Does that feel like influence or manipulation to you, and why?
4. When you are trying to persuade someone, what is your relationship to timing? Do you act when the argument is ready, or when the person is ready? What is the difference, in your experience?
5. What is one belief you hold that you have never actually examined for its framing? What assumptions are embedded in the way you hold that belief?
6. Who in your life is particularly good at influence in the sense this chapter describes? What do they do that you could learn from?

## **Chapter One: My Reflections**

## **Chapter One: Continued**

The Language of Rooms

Reading Power, Space, and Nonverbal Communication in Negotiation

Everything communicates. The question is whether you are listening.

CHAPTER TWO

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# The Language of Rooms

Power Has a Geography

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*Before a single word is spoken in a negotiation, the room itself has*

# The Language of Rooms

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much space each party occupies, how formal or informal the seating arrangement is: all of these are signals in a communication channel that runs parallel to and often beneath the verbal one. Proxemics, the study of how humans use space as communication, was formalized by anthropologist Edward Hall in the 1960s. Hall identified four zones of interpersonal distance, each of which carries different social meaning: intimate, personal, social, and public. Understanding which zone a given interaction occupies, and when those zones are crossed, is a foundational skill in any environment where power and relationship are being negotiated simultaneously.

**Status Signals and Their Interpretation** Status is communicated through an elaborate and largely unconscious set of signals: how much space a person takes up, how long they hold eye contact, who speaks first, who interrupts whom, whose statements are followed by silence and whose by immediate rebuttal. In most cultures, high-status

individuals take more space, speak more, interrupt more, and receive more deference in their interruptions. For skilled negotiators, reading these signals accurately is as important as any verbal content. Understanding who actually holds power in a room versus who nominally holds the title, identifying who the decision-maker defers to, tracking whose body language shifts when a particular topic arises: these observations inform strategy in ways that listening to words alone never will.

**Mirroring and Rapport Architecture** Humans unconsciously mirror the body language, speech rhythms, and emotional tone of people they feel connected to. This mirroring, documented extensively in research on embodied cognition and social bonding, is a signal of alignment and a mechanism for deepening it. When two people are in genuine rapport, their bodies often reflect each other without either party being aware of it. Skilled

## **negotiators**

use

## **intentional**

## **mirroring**

as

one

of

## **many**

rapport-building tools. Not mimicry, which is detectable and produces the opposite effect, but gentle alignment: matching the pace and register of speech, adopting similar posture, reflecting emotional tone. The effect is subtle and powerful. People feel understood by those whose nonverbal communication mirrors their own, and feeling understood is the precondition for productive negotiation.

## **The Silence Tool**

Of all the nonverbal tools available to a negotiator, silence is among the most underused and most powerful. Most people are deeply uncomfortable with silence in social contexts and will fill it automatically, often revealing information, making concessions, or backing away from positions they would have held if they had simply waited. Research on negotiation behavior consistently shows that novice negotiators speak too much and listen too little. Skilled negotiators use silence strategically: to allow the other party to continue speaking after they have said what they planned to say, to signal that a response is inadequate, to create space for reflection before committing to a position. Learning to be comfortable with silence is learning to use one of the most effective tools in the diplomat's kit.

**Environmental Control** Wherever possible, skilled negotiators pay attention to the physical environment of a negotiation and, where possible, shape it. The choice between a conference table and a round table, between formal and informal seating, between the other party's territory and neutral ground: these choices are not incidental. They are part of the negotiation itself. Research on environmental psychology documents that physical comfort, lighting, temperature, and seating arrangements all influence cognitive state and decision-making quality. Negotiations conducted in environments where both parties feel comfortable and equal tend to produce better outcomes than those conducted in environments that signal hierarchy or threat. Creating the conditions for a good conversation is itself a form of diplomatic preparation.

## Maria Theresa of Austria 1717 to 1780

Maria Theresa inherited the Habsburg throne in 1740 at the age of twenty-three, and inherited it under conditions designed to ensure she could not hold it. The Pragmatic Sanction that allowed a woman to inherit the Habsburg lands had been accepted by the major European powers, but tested immediately by Prussia, Bavaria, France, and Saxony, all of whom moved to seize Habsburg territory the moment her father died. The War of Austrian Succession lasted eight years. Maria Theresa lost Silesia to Frederick the Great of Prussia, a wound she never forgot, but held the rest of her empire through a combination of military resistance and diplomatic maneuver that transformed the European balance of power. When she was done, she had not only preserved her throne but had begun the process of rebuilding the alliance structure of Europe to isolate Prussia. The achievement that historians call the Diplomatic Revolution of 1756 was largely her work. Austria, which had been allied with Britain and opposed to France for a generation, reversed its position and allied with France, its longtime enemy, against Prussia. This was not a reversal forced by events. It was a deliberate diplomatic strategy orchestrated primarily by Maria Theresa and her foreign minister Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz. What made it possible was Maria Theresa's willingness to set aside the inherited hostilities of generations in order to pursue the actual strategic interest of her state. She did not like France. She had little personal regard for Louis XV or his court. None of that mattered. What mattered was that France and Austria had a common interest in containing Prussian power, and that building an alliance around that shared interest required suppressing everything else.

Maria Theresa ruled for forty years, raised sixteen children, reformed the Austrian legal and administrative system, and built a diplomatic network that kept the Habsburg empire intact through repeated challenges. She was not sentimental about power. She understood that sitting at the table required knowing what you were willing to give and what you were not, and never confusing the two.

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## REFLECTION QUESTIONS

### **The Language of Rooms**

#### *Questions for Personal Application*

1. In the professional environments you operate in, who controls the physical space of meetings and negotiations? What does that control communicate, and is it always conscious? 2. Think of a conversation where you felt immediately comfortable, and one where you felt immediately uncomfortable, before many words had been exchanged. What nonverbal signals

do you think were creating those experiences? 3. How do you use silence? Do you tend to fill it, or are you comfortable letting it sit? When has silence worked in your favor, or against you? 4. Recall a negotiation or difficult conversation where you were conscious of power dynamics in the room. What were the signals, and how did they affect your behavior? 5. Where do you find it easiest to have honest conversations: in formal settings, informal settings, side by side versus face to face? What does that tell

you about your own nonverbal comfort zones? 6. Think of someone whose body language and nonverbal communication is consistently effective. What specifically do they do, and how does it affect the people around them?

## Chapter Two: My Reflections

### Chapter Two: Continued

The Concession Framework Strategic Giving, Anchoring, and the Science of Reciprocal Movement

Every concession is an investment. The question is what return you are building toward.

## CHAPTER THREE

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# The Concession Framework

Why Concessions Matter

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*Negotiation is movement. If both parties hold their opening positions with no*

## CHAPTER THREE

# The Concession Framework

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reaching agreement requires both parties to move from where they started, and the management of that movement is what the concession framework addresses. Concessions serve multiple functions simultaneously. They are the mechanism through which agreement is built. They are also signals: about how much you value the outcome, about what you are willing to trade, about whether you are negotiating in good faith. How you make concessions, and how you receive them, communicates as much as the concessions themselves.

Anchoring and the First Number Research in behavioral economics has established that the first number introduced in a negotiation functions as an anchor that disproportionately influences all subsequent discussion. Even when both parties know that an opening offer is extreme, it shapes the range within which they negotiate. The adjustment from an anchor is typically insufficient, which means the person who sets the anchor has a structural advantage.

This does not mean opening aggressively in every negotiation. It means being deliberate about first offers and understanding the anchoring effect before it operates on you. When the other party opens with a number, recognizing it as an anchor and explicitly resetting the reference point is a foundational counter-anchoring skill.

**The Pattern of Concessions** How you make concessions matters as much as what you concede. Research on negotiation behavior shows that concessions that decrease in size over time signal approaching limits: the negotiator is running out of room. Concessions that are made quickly signal that the initial position was not strongly held. Concessions that are traded for nothing signal that they were not actually worth anything. Effective concession strategy involves making fewer, smaller concessions over time rather than large concessions under pressure, attaching conditions to concessions where possible, and pausing between concessions to allow reciprocal movement from the other side. The pattern communicates as much as the substance.

**Trading vs. Giving** There is a critical distinction between trading concessions and giving them. A traded concession is explicit: I will do this if you do that. A given concession is unilateral: I will do this, and I will not explicitly ask for anything in return, though I will note that I have done it. Each strategy has appropriate contexts.

Unilateral concessions, particularly early in a negotiation, activate the reciprocity principle described in Chapter 1. They build goodwill and signal a collaborative rather than adversarial approach. But unilateral concessions made under pressure, without acknowledgment, or in contexts where the other

party is not reciprocating, deplete the negotiating position without return. Knowing the difference between a strategic gift and a forced retreat is the skill.

What Is Actually on the Table One of the most consistent findings in negotiation research is that parties routinely fail to identify all the issues that could be included in an agreement. They focus on the single dimension that is most salient, negotiate hard on that dimension, and leave value on the table that a more comprehensive view of the situation would have captured. The practice of identifying all the interests at stake, not just the positions, and looking for trades across those interests is the foundation of interest-based negotiation. When two parties are negotiating over a single resource, agreement is only possible if one party gets less. When they are negotiating over multiple interests, agreement often becomes possible in which both parties get more than they would have through pure positional bargaining.

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## HISTORICAL PROFILE

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### Queen Elizabeth I 1533 to 1603

Elizabeth Tudor came to the throne of England in 1558 inheriting a kingdom that was financially depleted, religiously divided, militarily weak, and surrounded by Catholic powers that regarded her as an illegitimate heretic with no right to rule. She died forty-five years later having played the major powers of Europe against each other for four decades without losing her throne, her country, or her freedom of action. The principal diplomatic tool Elizabeth used throughout her reign was the marriage question. Every European monarch who wanted an alliance with England raised the possibility of marriage to Elizabeth. She never married. But she negotiated the possibility for forty years, keeping Spain hopeful, keeping France hopeful, managing the internal English factions that wanted her married and producing an heir, and never closing the door until closing it was no longer necessary. Her advisors, almost universally, believed this was reckless. They wanted her married and the succession secured. Elizabeth understood something they did not: that her value as a potential wife was a diplomatic asset that marriage would permanently eliminate. As long as she was available, she had leverage. The moment she chose, she lost it. This is interest-based thinking applied to a personal situation. Her advisors were focused on the position: get married, secure the succession. Elizabeth was focused on the interest: maintain the maximum freedom of action for England in a hostile European environment. The two analyses pointed in opposite directions. She was not without losses. The execution of Mary Queen of Scots, the failed interventions in the Low Countries, the cost of the war with Spain: these were real. But England survived, grew stronger, and maintained its independence through a reign that required constant negotiation with superior powers. Elizabeth's greatest diplomatic achievement was never the treaties she signed. It was the wars she did not have to fight because she was too useful as a potential ally to destroy.

REFLECTION QUESTIONS

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**The Concession Framework***Questions for Personal Application*

1. In negotiations you have been part of, where do you typically set your opening position relative to your actual goal? Too close, too far, or calibrated intentionally? 2. Think of a time when you made a concession under pressure that you later regretted. What was the dynamic, and what would a more strategic approach have looked like? 3. Where in your life do you give concessions unilaterally, without acknowledgment or reciprocal expectation? Is that a conscious strategy or a habit? Does it serve you? 4. Identify a recurring negotiation in your life where the parties routinely argue over a single dimension. What other dimensions might be in play that are not currently on the table? 5. What is your relationship to the first number in a financial negotiation? Do you set it, or do you let the other side set it? How does that affect the outcome? 6. Think of a negotiation in which you discovered a hidden interest that changed what was possible. What opened that up, and what could you do to create those conditions more reliably?

**Chapter Three: My Reflections****Chapter Three: Continued****The Empathy Advantage Perspective-Taking as Tactical Skill**

To understand someone is not to agree with them. It is to know what agreement would actually require.

CHAPTER FOUR

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# The Empathy Advantage

Empathy Is Not Agreement

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*There is a common conflation between empathy and endorsement that makes*

## CHAPTER FOUR

# The Empathy Advantage

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the position you hold, does that mean I have to accept it? If I can articulate your interests as well as you can, have I conceded the argument? The answer is no. Empathy, as this chapter uses the term, is the capacity to accurately understand another person's perspective, emotional state, and underlying interests. It does not require agreement. It does not require sympathy. It requires only the disciplined cognitive effort to model the world as another person experiences it. And it is one of the most powerful tools available to a negotiator precisely because most people in competitive situations are too invested in their own perspective to do it.

Cognitive vs. Emotional Empathy Research in social neuroscience distinguishes between two types of empathy that engage different neural systems. Cognitive empathy, sometimes called perspective-taking, is the capacity to understand intellectually what another person thinks and feels. Emotional empathy is the capacity to feel, to some degree, what another person feels: to resonate with their emotional state.

Both are relevant in negotiation, but cognitive empathy is the more directly actionable skill. Emotional empathy without cognitive structure can lead to emotional flooding: being so affected by another person's distress that rational decision-making is compromised. Cognitive empathy allows you to understand another person's emotional state clearly enough to respond to it effectively, without losing your own ground.

The Interests Behind the Positions Roger Fisher and William Ury's foundational work on interest-based negotiation introduced a distinction that transformed the field: the difference between positions, which are what people say they want, and interests, which are why they want it. People negotiate positions. Agreements are built from interests. A classic illustration: two people are arguing over an orange. Each wants the whole orange. The positional negotiation ends with each getting half, and both are disappointed. But if you ask why each wants the orange, you discover one wants the juice and the other wants the peel for baking. Both can have what they actually need. The positional negotiation missed this entirely because no one asked the empathic question: what are you trying to do?

The Art of the Question Effective empathic intelligence in negotiation is expressed primarily through questions. Not rhetorical questions, not questions designed to expose weaknesses, but genuine inquiries into what matters to the other party and why. What does success look like from your perspective? What are the constraints

you are operating under that I may not be aware of? What would make this agreement difficult for you to defend to your constituents? These questions do something that arguing rarely does: they demonstrate that you are genuinely interested in understanding the other party's position rather than simply defeating it. That demonstration shifts the dynamic of the negotiation from adversarial to collaborative, which opens the possibility of outcomes that neither party could have designed alone.

**Managing Your Own Perspective** The obstacle to empathic intelligence in negotiation is almost always internal. When we are invested in a position, when we are under pressure, when we believe we are right and the other party is wrong, the motivation to understand them accurately evaporates. We stop listening to understand and start listening to respond. The practice of separating the people from the problem, another concept from Fisher and Ury's framework, is a discipline for managing this internal obstacle. The other party is not your adversary. They are a person with legitimate interests trying to get to a place that works for them. Your job is to find out what that place is, and see whether a path there can be built that also takes you where you need to go.

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## REFLECTION QUESTIONS

### **The Empathy Advantage**

#### *Questions for Personal Application*

1. Choose a current disagreement in your life. Can you articulate the other person's position, interests, and constraints as well as they could themselves? If not, what information are you missing?
2. In difficult conversations, at what point do you stop listening to understand and start listening to respond? What triggers that shift for you?
3. Think of a time when you were persuaded not by argument but by feeling genuinely understood. What did the other person do, and what shifted for you?
4. What is the difference, in your experience, between feeling sympathy for someone and having cognitive empathy for their position? Have you ever had empathy for a position you strongly disagreed with?
5. In which relationships do you find perspective-taking easiest? In which do you find it hardest? What does that pattern tell you?
6. Identify a position that someone in your life holds that you have never genuinely tried to understand from the inside. What might you learn if you did?

## **Chapter Four: My Reflections**

## Chapter Four: Continued

### Social Currency

Trust-Building, Rapport Architecture, and the Long Ledger of Credibility

Trust is not given. It is accumulated. Every interaction either adds to the account or draws it down.

## CHAPTER FIVE

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# Social Currency

What Trust Actually Is

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*Trust is not a feeling. It is a judgment: a prediction that someone's future*

# Social Currency

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That judgment is based on evidence, accumulated over time, about reliability, competence, and alignment of interests. Understanding trust as a judgment rather than a feeling is important because it means trust can be built deliberately, through consistent behavior over time, rather than simply waited for. Research in organizational behavior identifies three components of trustworthiness: competence, the belief that someone can do what they say they will do; integrity, the belief that they will keep their commitments; and benevolence, the belief that they have your interests at least partially in mind. Absence in any of these dimensions limits trust even when the others are present. You can trust someone's competence without trusting their motives. You can trust their integrity without trusting their judgment.

**Rapport vs. Relationship** Rapport is the surface condition of comfortable interaction: the sense that a conversation is going well, that the other party is engaged and responsive, that the communication is relatively easy. Relationship is something deeper and

more durable: a history of interaction that has established mutual understanding, shared context, and accumulated credit. In negotiation, rapport is useful but insufficient. It can be manufactured and, when manufactured, detected. It does not survive conflict. Relationship, built through genuine engagement over time, is the resource that allows negotiations to continue productively when the going gets difficult. The investment in building relationships before you need them is one of the most consistent differentiators between skilled and unskilled diplomats.

**The Credibility Account** Credibility functions like an account: actions make deposits or withdrawals. Keeping commitments, being accurate about what you know and what you do not, acknowledging mistakes without deflection, following through on minor commitments as reliably as major ones: these are deposits. Missing commitments without acknowledgment, overstating certainty, failing to deliver on small things, saying one thing and doing another: these are withdrawals. The account is asymmetric. Research on trust repair documents that trust is easier to destroy than to build, and that some withdrawals are very hard to recover from. A single instance of perceived deception can eliminate the accumulation of years of consistent behavior. This asymmetry is not a counsel of paralysis. It is a counsel of seriousness about the cost of shortcuts.

## Consistency Across Contexts

One of the most powerful trust signals is behavioral consistency across contexts: being the same person whether the stakes are high or low, whether you are observed or unobserved, whether the other party has current leverage or does not. Inconsistency across contexts, even in minor matters, generates the prediction that behavior may differ in ways that matter. For negotiators who operate across multiple relationships and multiple time horizons, reputation, the accumulated account of how you behave across contexts, is among the most valuable assets you carry. You cannot control what others say about you. You can control whether what they say is accurate.

**Building Trust Under Time Pressure** Not every negotiation has the luxury of time for relationship-building. Sometimes you are at a table with someone you have never met, and the negotiation will be over before a genuine relationship could develop. In these contexts, trust-building compresses into first-impression management: the signals you send in the opening minutes about whether you are competent, whether your commitments are real, and whether you can be a reliable partner in the conversation. Research on thin-slicing, the process by which people make rapid judgments from minimal information, shows that first impressions are formed in seconds and are revised slowly and reluctantly. This is not an argument for impression management as performance. It is an argument for being genuinely prepared, genuinely attentive, and genuinely clear about what you are there to do, from the first moment you arrive.

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## REFLECTION QUESTIONS

### **Social Currency**

#### *Questions for Personal Application*

1. If you assessed your credibility account with three people in your professional life, what would the balance look like? What has built it, and what has drawn it down? 2. Think of someone whose trust you have been slow to extend. What evidence would they need to provide to change that assessment, and is that a reasonable standard? 3. Where in your life is there a gap between your behavior when observed and your behavior when unobserved? How does that gap affect your credibility in ways you may not be aware of? 4. Identify a relationship that has genuine depth, not just rapport. How was it built, and what has sustained it through difficulty? 5. What small commitments do you regularly make that you do not always keep? What does that pattern cost you in terms of predictability and trust? 6. In a high-stakes first impression context, what signals do you send in the first five minutes? What would you like to be sending, and how close are the two?

## **Chapter Five: My Reflections**

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## Chapter Five: Continued

The Long Game Strategic Patience, Multiple Timeframes, and Playing for the Outcome That Matters

Most people optimize for the next move. The diplomat optimizes for the last one.

## CHAPTER SIX

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# The Long Game

The Timeframe Problem

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*One of the most consistent differences between skilled and unskilled negotiators*

## CHAPTER SIX

# The Long Game

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want to win this exchange, secure this agreement, get the best possible outcome in the meeting that is happening now. Skilled negotiators maintain awareness of a longer arc: the relationship that extends beyond this negotiation, the reputation that will affect the next one, the precedent that this agreement sets for the agreements that follow. This does not mean sacrificing present interests for speculative future ones. It means evaluating present decisions within a longer context, and understanding that a short-term win that destroys a long-term relationship often costs more than it gains.

**Strategic Patience as Discipline** Strategic patience is not passivity. It is the disciplined capacity to refrain from acting when the moment is not right, while continuing to prepare, to build relationships, and to maintain options, until the moment that is right arrives. It requires tolerating the discomfort of not yet having what you want, and trusting the analysis that says the time is not yet correct.

The mistake most negotiators make is confusing urgency with importance. The thing that feels urgent in the moment is often not the thing that matters most over time. Strategic patience involves distinguishing between these two categories and having the discipline to act on that distinction even when the pressure to move immediately is real.

**Multiple Timeframes Simultaneously** Skilled diplomats operate on multiple timeframes at once. There is the immediate negotiation: what happens in this room today. There is the medium-term relationship: what the interaction today does to the relationship over the next year. There is the strategic arc: how today's agreement positions the parties relative to each other and relative to third parties over years or decades. All three timeframes are real and all three require attention simultaneously. An agreement that optimizes for the immediate negotiation while damaging the medium-term relationship is often a net loss. An agreement that builds the medium-term relationship at the cost of the strategic position may also be a loss. The skill is holding all three timeframes in awareness at once and making decisions that serve all three as well as possible.

**Knowing When to Walk Away** Fisher and Ury introduced the concept of the BATNA: the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement. Knowing your BATNA, the best outcome you can achieve without an agreement, is one of the most important pieces of

preparation a negotiator can do. It defines your reservation point: the point at which the negotiation is no longer worth continuing. The ability to walk away, and to know precisely when that point has been reached, is not a failure of negotiation. It is the expression of a clear analysis of your actual interests

and alternatives. Negotiators who cannot walk away are negotiators who can be exploited. The BATNA is not a threat to deploy. It is a private calibration of your real position.

**The Relationship After the Negotiation** How you behave after an agreement is reached matters as much as how you negotiate it. Implementation sends powerful signals about whether the commitment made in negotiation was genuine. Parties who discover after the fact that the other side is interpreting an agreement in ways that were not intended, or who observe the other party finding technical compliance with letter while violating spirit, update their trust calibration accordingly. The long-game diplomat understands that every agreement is also a data point in the ongoing relationship. Agreements honored fully, on time, without requiring pressure to implement: these are trust deposits that pay forward into the next negotiation. Agreements honored minimally or grudgingly are withdrawals that make the next agreement harder to reach.

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## REFLECTION QUESTIONS

### **The Long Game**

#### *Questions for Personal Application*

1. Think of a current situation where you are feeling pressure to act

immediately. What would it look like to hold that situation in a longer timeframe? Does the analysis change? 2. Identify a decision you made that optimized for the immediate negotiation at the cost of the long-term relationship. With hindsight, was that the right trade? 3. What is your BATNA in a significant negotiation you are currently involved in? Have you actually identified it clearly, or are you operating with a vague sense that you need the agreement to work? 4. In which relationships do you find it easiest to play a long game? In which do you find it hardest? What is the difference? 5. Think of an agreement you reached that was later contested in implementation. What in the negotiation process set up that outcome, and what could have been different? 6. Where in your life are you optimizing for the next move when you should be optimizing for the last one? What would need to change to shift that?

## **Chapter Six: My Reflections**

## **Chapter Six: Continued**

Common Ground Architecture Finding Shared Interests Beneath Opposing Positions

People are not against you. They are for themselves. That distinction changes everything.

CHAPTER SEVEN

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# Common Ground Architecture

The Difference Between Positions and Interests

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*A position is what someone says they want. An interest is why they want it. The*

# Common Ground Architecture

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now foundational in negotiation theory, is perhaps the single most important insight in the field: that most negotiation failure is not about incompatible interests but about incompatible positions that obscure compatible underlying interests. The classic example is a dispute over a window: two people in a library, one who wants it open and one who wants it closed. A positional negotiation produces an unsatisfying compromise: half open. An interest-based inquiry reveals that one person wants fresh air and the other wants to avoid a draft. Opening a window in an adjacent room satisfies both interests completely. Neither position was the problem. Treating the positions as the problem was the problem.

**Mapping the Interests in the Room Before a negotiation, and continuously during it, skilled diplomats work to map the full interest landscape of the situation. What does each party actually care about? What are their constraints, not just their preferences? What are the**

interests of stakeholders who are not at the table but whose reactions will determine whether any agreement can be implemented? This mapping is not purely intellectual. It involves conversations, questions, and the careful observation of what makes the other party animated and what makes them go quiet. It involves understanding the institutional context in which the other party operates: what pressures they are under, who they answer to, what agreements they can make and defend. The map is never complete, but the discipline of trying to complete it produces better outcomes than treating the other party as a single-interest obstacle.

**Generating Options Before Evaluating Them** One of the most consistent patterns in dysfunctional negotiation is premature evaluation. Parties propose options and immediately begin evaluating them: that will not work, we cannot accept that, this is a non-starter. This pattern inhibits the generation of creative solutions because it treats every proposal as a commitment rather than an exploration. Fisher and Ury's recommendation to separate the invention phase from the evaluation phase is a structural fix for this problem. Before either party commits to evaluating options, both parties brainstorm options without prejudice: anything that might conceivably satisfy the interests at stake goes on the table. Only after the option space is relatively complete does evaluation begin. This process consistently generates solutions that neither party had considered entering the room.

**Objective Criteria and Legitimate Standards** When interests genuinely conflict, and sometimes they do, the negotiation needs a principled basis for resolution that neither party experiences as capitulation to the other. Fisher and Ury call these objective criteria: external standards that both parties can acknowledge as legitimate regardless of which side they favor. Market rates, legal precedent, expert opinion, historical practice, scientific data: these are the kinds of criteria that allow one party to move

from a position without appearing to surrender to the other party's will. The frame shifts from I am giving you what you want to we are both agreeing to follow a legitimate standard. This shift makes agreement possible in situations where neither party could afford to appear defeated.

**The Ongoing Relationship as the Agreement** Many of the most important negotiations in life are not one-time events but episodes in ongoing relationships: with employers, with partners, with children, with colleagues, with neighbors. In these contexts, the agreement reached in any given negotiation is less important than the process by which it is reached, because the process shapes the relationship that will produce the next negotiation. A negotiation concluded in ways that leave one party feeling unheard, dismissed, or coerced will produce an agreement that is technically signed but emotionally contested. That contest will surface in implementation, in the next negotiation, and in the relationship. A negotiation concluded in ways that both parties experience as fair, even if neither got everything they wanted, produces a different kind of agreement and a different kind of relationship to carry forward.

This is the final insight of the diplomat: that the relationship is itself an outcome, and often the most important one.

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## REFLECTION QUESTIONS

### **Common Ground Architecture**

#### *Questions for Personal Application*

1. Choose a current conflict in your life. Can you state the other party's

interests as distinct from their position? What are they actually trying to achieve, and how does knowing that change your view of the situation? 2. Think of a negotiation where you or the other party moved first on generating options rather than evaluating them. What happened, and how did it compare to negotiations where evaluation came first? 3. Where in your professional relationships are you negotiating positions when you could be negotiating interests? What would it take to shift the conversation? 4. Identify an objective criterion or legitimate standard that could resolve a current dispute you are in or observing. What would it take for both parties to accept it? 5. Think of a negotiation in an ongoing relationship that left one party feeling unheard. How did that affect the relationship afterward, and what is the residue now?

6. What is one area of your life where you consistently treat negotiation as

a one-time event rather than an episode in an ongoing relationship? What would change if you held it differently?

## **Chapter Seven: My Reflections**

## **Chapter Seven: Continued**

# The Table You

# The Table You

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Now Own

CONCLUSION

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# The Table You Now Own

## CONCLUSION

# The Table You Now Own

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Diplomacy is not a talent. It is a discipline. Everything in this book describes skills that can be learned, practiced, and deepened over time: the ability to understand interests beneath positions, to build trust through consistent behavior, to make and receive concessions strategically, to read a room before the first word is spoken, to hold a longer timeframe when pressure is pushing for a shorter one. The women profiled in these chapters did not have access to formal training. Eleanor Roosevelt learned negotiation by negotiating. Maria Theresa learned strategy by losing and adapting. Elizabeth I learned patience because the cost of impatience was clear. Bertha von Suttner learned persuasion by writing and speaking until her arguments found their audience. None of them arrived at their tables with these skills fully formed. They developed them through use, under conditions that did not forgive significant errors. You are in a different position. You have a framework that took centuries of diplomatic practice and decades of research to build. You have names for what you are doing and why it works. You have the historical record of women who did this before you, in harder conditions and without the framework you now hold. The Diplomat Ribbon will give you the operational practice: the simulations, the feedback, the structured repetition that is how skills become automatic rather than deliberate. What this book has given you is the foundation beneath the practice: the reason the skills work, the history of the women who

proved they do, and the understanding that every room you enter is a negotiation, whether it is named that or not. You will sit at tables where the stakes are high and the other parties have more experience, more credentials, or more institutional power than you do. None of that determines the outcome. What determines the outcome is who in the room has the clearest picture of what everyone actually needs, and the discipline to build toward it. That is a skill. You now have it. Use it well.

## Mission Possible Spy Academy

## Conclusion: My Reflections

## Conclusion: My Reflections

## Tools

## Operational Self-Assessment

Use this assessment at the beginning of your Profiler Ribbon work, and again when you complete the course. It is not a test. There are no correct answers. It is a calibration tool: a way of taking a precise inventory of your starting point so that change, when it happens, is visible.

Rate each statement on a scale of 1 to 5: 1 = Not at all like me. 3 = Sometimes like me. 5 = Consistently like me.

1. Influence Architecture I understand the distinction between influence and manipulation, and I apply that distinction consistently in how I approach persuasion in professional and personal contexts. [ ] 1. I have not thought explicitly about this distinction and tend to use persuasion instinctively without examining the approach. [ ] 2. I understand the distinction intellectually but find it hard to apply consistently under pressure or when the stakes are high. [ ] 3. I apply this distinction regularly and can usually identify whether an approach I am considering is genuinely influence or manipulation. [ ] 4. I apply this distinction automatically and it shapes my approach to persuasion at a foundational level, including how I evaluate approaches proposed by others.

2. Empathic Intelligence I can accurately articulate the interests, constraints, and perspective of a person I am in conflict or negotiation with, at a level of detail they would recognize as accurate. [ ] 1. I focus primarily on my own position and interests in negotiation and rarely invest significant effort in understanding the other party's perspective. [ ] 2. I make some effort to understand the other party's perspective but tend to focus on their stated positions rather than the underlying interests. [ ] 3. I consistently try to understand both positions and interests, and can usually articulate the other party's perspective with reasonable accuracy. [ ] 4. I invest systematic effort in understanding the other party's full interest landscape before and during negotiation, and verify my understanding through questions and observation.

3. Concession Management I manage concessions deliberately, with awareness of timing, pattern, and the signals each concession sends about my actual position and limits. [ ] 1. I make concessions reactively, responding to pressure without a clear strategy for when and how much to concede. [ ] 2. I have some awareness of concession dynamics but find it hard to maintain strategic discipline when the negotiation becomes pressured or emotional. [ ] 3. I approach concessions strategically, thinking about timing, pattern, and reciprocity, and can usually maintain that discipline under moderate pressure. [ ] 4. I manage concessions as an integral part of negotiation strategy, with clear awareness of anchoring, the signals concession patterns send, and the relationship

between concessions and the long-term position.

4. Trust and Credibility I have an accurate picture of my credibility account with the key people in my professional life, and I actively manage my behavior to build rather than draw down that account. [ ] 1. I do not think explicitly about credibility as an account and tend to focus on individual interactions rather than the cumulative pattern. [ ] 2. I am aware of credibility as a concept but have not assessed it systematically with specific people in my professional relationships. [ ] 3. I have a reasonably accurate sense of my credibility with key people and generally behave in ways that protect and build it. [ ] 4. I actively manage my credibility account with key people, including following through on small commitments, acknowledging errors without deflection, and behaving consistently across contexts.

5. Strategic Patience I can distinguish between situations that call for immediate action and those that call for strategic patience, and I can hold that patience when the analysis says the moment is not yet right. [ ] 1. I tend to act when an opportunity arises or when pressure is present, and find it difficult to maintain a longer timeframe under conditions of urgency. [ ] 2. I understand strategic patience conceptually but find it difficult to apply when I am personally invested in the outcome or under time pressure from others. [ ] 3. I can usually distinguish between urgency and importance, and can hold a longer timeframe in most situations, including moderately pressured ones.

[ ] 4. I routinely evaluate immediate decisions within multiple timeframes simultaneously and can sustain strategic patience under significant pressure when the analysis supports it.

6. Common Ground Architecture I actively look for shared interests beneath opposing positions in conflict and negotiation, and I generate options before evaluating them rather than jumping to evaluation prematurely. [ ] 1. I tend to focus on positions and find it difficult to see beyond them to underlying interests, especially when the conflict is personal or the positions are strongly held. [ ] 2. I understand the position/interest distinction and sometimes apply it, but often revert to positional thinking when the conversation becomes difficult. [ ] 3. I consistently try to identify underlying interests and look for shared ground, and can usually do this even in moderately difficult negotiations. [ ] 4. I approach conflict and negotiation from a default of interest-based thinking, including generating a full option space before evaluating any option, and using legitimate standards to resolve genuine interest conflicts.

Score Interpretation Level 1 (mostly first options) You are beginning this work with real room to grow. That is the correct starting condition. The Profiler Ribbon is calibrated exactly for this starting point. Level 2 (mostly second options)

You have developed real situational awareness but have not yet systematized it. The Ribbon will give you the vocabulary and the protocol that makes what you already do more consistent and reliable. Level 3 (mostly third options) You are already reading people with substantial accuracy. The Profiler Ribbon will sharpen the precision of the read and extend it into high-pressure situations where your

current skill degrades. Level 4 (mostly fourth options) You are operating at an advanced baseline. The Capstone Mission will be your growth edge: not acquiring the skills but integrating them under sustained operational conditions.

Take this assessment again after completing the Profiler Ribbon. The changes will be specific and measurable.

## **Assessment: Notes & Observations**

## **Assessment: Notes & Observations**

## **ASSESSMENT: INITIAL SCORES (DATE: \_\_\_\_\_)**

## **Assessment: Initial Scores (Date: \_\_\_\_\_)**

## **Reference**

Key Terms Definitions of terms and concepts used throughout this book, organized alphabetically for reference.

Anchoring The cognitive phenomenon in which the first number introduced in a negotiation disproportionately shapes the range and outcome of subsequent discussion, even when both parties know the anchor is extreme.

## **Batna**

Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement. The best outcome a party can achieve without an agreement. Knowing one's BATNA defines the reservation point below which no agreement is preferable to any agreement.

Cognitive empathy The capacity to understand intellectually what another person thinks and feels, sometimes called perspective-taking. Distinct from emotional empathy in that it involves accurate modeling of another's perspective without necessarily sharing their emotional state.

**Common ground** In negotiation, the area of compatible or overlapping interests that exists beneath the opposing positions of the parties. Identifying common ground is a prerequisite for interest-based agreement.

**Concession** A modification of a negotiating position in the direction of the other party. Concessions can be traded, given unilaterally, or linked to conditions, and the pattern and timing of

concessions communicates information about the negotiator's real position and limits.

**Credibility** The accumulated judgment of others about a party's competence, integrity, and reliability. Distinguished from reputation in that credibility is assessed through direct evidence rather than through the observations of third parties.

**Decision fatigue** The deterioration of decision quality that occurs as the brain's capacity for deliberation is depleted over the course of a day. Relevant to negotiation timing, as proposals evaluated under conditions of decision fatigue are assessed differently than those evaluated with full cognitive resources.

**Dual-process theory** The model of human decision-making that distinguishes between a fast, intuitive processing system operating below conscious awareness, and a slower, deliberative system that generates post-hoc reasoning. Both systems are engaged in negotiation.

**Emotional empathy** The capacity to feel, to some degree, what another person feels: to resonate with their emotional state. Distinct from cognitive empathy and potentially counterproductive in high-stakes negotiation if it produces emotional flooding.

**Framing** The effect of context and language on how information is perceived and evaluated. The same content presented in different frames produces measurably different responses, making framing one of the most powerful tools in influence and negotiation.

**Interest** In negotiation theory, the underlying need, concern, or goal that a position is designed to satisfy. Interest-based negotiation focuses on interests rather than positions because interests are more often compatible than the positions that represent them.

## **Interest-based negotiation**

A negotiation approach developed by Roger Fisher and William Ury that focuses on the interests of the parties rather than their stated positions, separates the people from the problem, generates options before evaluating them, and uses objective criteria to resolve genuine conflicts.

**Legitimate standards** External criteria accepted by both parties as a fair basis for resolving disputes, such as market rates, legal precedent, or scientific data. Using legitimate standards allows parties to move from positions without appearing to capitulate to the other side.

**Mirroring** The unconscious or intentional alignment of body language, speech rhythm, and emotional tone with another person. A natural component of genuine rapport and a tool for building it deliberately when used with precision rather than mimicry.

**Objective criteria** See legitimate standards. The term used by Fisher and Ury for external standards that provide a principled basis for resolving conflicts without either party experiencing the resolution as submission to the other's will.

**Position** In negotiation theory, what a party says they want, as distinct from the underlying interest the position is designed to serve. Positional negotiation focuses on positions; interest-based negotiation seeks the interests beneath them.

**Proxemics** The study of how humans use physical space as a form of social communication, developed by anthropologist Edward Hall. Includes the identification of intimate, personal, social, and public zones of interpersonal distance.

**Rapport** The surface condition of comfortable and engaged interaction between parties. Distinguished from relationship in that rapport can be created quickly but is less durable and does not survive conflict without the deeper trust that genuine relationship provides.

**Reciprocity** The social norm, documented cross-culturally by Robert Cialdini and others, that creates pressure to return what has been received. One of the most robust influence principles: unilateral concessions, generosity, and information-sharing create social pressure for reciprocal behavior.

**Reservation point** The point at which a negotiated agreement is no longer preferable to the BATNA. Below the reservation point, no deal is better than any deal. Knowing one's reservation point precisely is a fundamental condition of effective negotiation.

**Soft power** A concept developed by political scientist Joseph Nye to describe influence achieved through attraction, persuasion, and the appeal of ideas and culture, as distinct from hard power, which relies on coercion or material incentives. Much of the diplomatic work described in this book operates through soft power.

**Strategic patience** The disciplined capacity to refrain from acting when the conditions are not optimal, while continuing to prepare and build options, until the moment for action arrives. Distinguished from passivity by the active preparation and ongoing awareness that accompany the waiting.

**Theory of mind** The cognitive capacity to attribute mental states, beliefs, desires, intentions, and knowledge to others and to recognize that those states may differ from one's own. A foundational component of both cognitive empathy and effective negotiation.

**Zone of possible agreement (ZOPA)** The range within which a negotiated agreement is preferable to both parties' BATNAs. If no ZOPA exists, no mutually beneficial agreement is possible. If a ZOPA exists, the negotiation is about where within that range the agreement lands.

## **Back Matter**

**Further Reading** The following works were foundational to the ideas in this book and are recommended for readers who wish to explore these subjects in greater depth.

**Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (1981)** by Fisher, Roger and Ury, William

The foundational text of interest-based negotiation. Introduced the position/interest distinction, the concept of BATNA, and the framework for separating people from problems. Still the most useful single volume for anyone learning negotiation.

**Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion (1984)** by Cialdini, Robert

The definitive research-based account of the six principles of influence: reciprocity, commitment and consistency, social proof, authority, liking, and scarcity. Essential reading for understanding the psychological architecture of persuasion.

**Never Split the Difference: Negotiating As If Your Life Depended On It (2016)** by Voss, Chris

A former FBI hostage negotiator's account of high-stakes negotiation technique. Particularly valuable for its treatment of tactical empathy, the mirroring technique, and calibrated questions as tools for understanding the other party's perspective.

**Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (2004)** by Nye, Joseph

The book that introduced and defined the concept of soft power: influence through attraction rather than coercion. Essential context for understanding why diplomacy is not merely a softer form of coercion but a categorically different kind of power.

*Madam Secretary: A Memoir* (2003) by Albright, Madeleine

Albright's account of her career from Czech refugee to U.S. Secretary of State. A practitioner's view of diplomacy at the highest levels, with particular value in its treatment of the relationship between values and strategic interests.

*The Negotiator: A Memoir* (2021) by Adler, Libby

A practitioner's account of negotiation in labor and employment contexts. Valuable for its ground-level treatment of how the theoretical frameworks of interest-based negotiation operate in adversarial real-world conditions.

*The Hidden Dimension* (1966) by Hall, Edward T.

Hall's foundational work on proxemics: how humans use space as a communication channel. Essential background for the chapter on nonverbal communication and the language of rooms.

*Talking from 9 to 5: Women and Men at Work* (1994) by Tannen, Deborah

Tannen's research-based examination of gender differences in professional communication styles, including negotiation. Directly relevant to women navigating workplaces where implicit communication norms were designed around different assumptions.

*Bargaining with the Devil: When to Negotiate, When to Fight* (2010) by Mnookin, Robert

A Harvard Law professor's framework for the hardest negotiation question: when is negotiation the right strategy and when does it validate a position that should be rejected? A necessary counterpoint to frameworks that treat negotiation as always preferable to alternatives.

*Everything Is Negotiable* (1983) by Kennedy, Gavin

A practical guide to the full range of negotiation contexts, with particular value in its insistence that the scope of what can be negotiated is far wider than most people assume, and that defaulting to non-negotiation is itself a choice with costs.

## The Series

### The MPSA Library Series

DIPLOMAT is Book Five of the MPSA Library Series: a collection of ten free reference books, one for each ribbon in the Mission Possible Spy Academy program. Each book provides the historical, scientific, and conceptual foundation for its corresponding ribbon course. They are companion volumes, not curriculum replacements. The courses teach tradecraft. The books explain why that tradecraft works: and how women have been using versions of it for centuries.

Book One: ANALYST Analyst Ribbon

Environmental awareness, the evolutionary origins of female perceptual intelligence, historical operatives, and the architecture of learned helplessness.

Book Two: PROFILER Profiler Ribbon

The science of behavioral reading: micro-expressions, baseline deviation, deception detection, and the history of women who read people for survival.

Book Three: SENTINEL Sentinel Ribbon

Personal security and threat assessment: stalking patterns, target selection, pre-incident indicators, and the women who understood threat before it materialized.

### Book Four: STRATEGIST

#### Strategist Ribbon

Strategic thinking, planning under uncertainty, decision science, and the women commanders and strategic thinkers history tried to forget.

Book Five: DIPLOMAT Diplomat Ribbon

Influence, persuasion, social engineering, and negotiation: the intelligence of soft power and the women who wielded it.

Book Six: HANDLER Handler Ribbon

Human intelligence, source development, trust and betrayal, and the women who ran networks of people in impossible conditions.

Book Seven: TACTICIAN Tactician Ribbon

Operational planning, counter-surveillance, cover and concealment, and the tactical thinking that kept women alive in hostile environments.

Book Eight: GUARDIAN Guardian Ribbon

Protective intelligence, close protection, emergency response, and the women who kept others safe when no one was keeping them safe.

Book Nine: GHOST Ghost Ribbon

Deep cover, identity management, the psychology of invisibility, and the women who lived double lives and brought both home.

Book Ten: FIELD COMMANDER Field Commander Ribbon

Leadership under fire, operational command, organizational intelligence, and the women who led when they were told they could not.

All ten books are free. All ten are available at [MissionPossibleSpyAcademy.com](http://MissionPossibleSpyAcademy.com).

**My Notes**

**My Notes**

**My Notes: Continued**

## **My Notes: Continued**

## **My Notes: Continued**

## **My Notes: Continued**

## **My Notes: Continued**

## **My Notes: Continued**

## **About the Author**

Dr. Terry Oroszi is the founder and director of Mission Possible Spy Academy, based in Dayton, Ohio. A U.S. Army veteran and behavioral intelligence educator, her career spans academia, federal consulting, and national security. She has worked with women across the United States and internationally, including women surviving under conditions of extreme threat, to develop practical skills in awareness, self-protection, and resilience.

She began writing the MPSA curriculum in 2013, long before AI-assisted content generation existed, driven by one conviction: that the skills of intelligence professionals: honed by decades of field experience and research: belong to every woman who needs them. The MPSA Library Series makes these foundations freely available to every MPSA student, everywhere.

"I started writing in 2013: not because it was easy, but because it needed to be done. These women needed this. They still do." Dr. Terry Oroszi

About Mission Possible Spy Academy Mission Possible Spy Academy (MPSA) is an intelligence-training program founded by Dr. Terry Oroszi. MPSA teaches women: and men: the foundational skills of situational awareness, behavioral analysis, deception detection, strategic communication, and operational discipline. The curriculum draws from intelligence tradecraft, behavioral science, and applied psychology. Courses are delivered online and accessible globally. The MPSA Library Series provides free companion reading for all MPSA ribbon courses.

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